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ABSTRACT 
Efficient Radiometric Signature Methods for Cognitive Radio Devices 
by 
Oviin<; Kocaba§ 
This thesis presents the first comprehensive study and new methods for radiomet-
ric fingerprinting of the Cognitive Radio (CR) devices. The scope of the currently 
available radio identification techniques is limited to a single radio adjustment. Yet, 
the variable nature of the CR with multiple levels of parameters and adjustments ren-
ders the radiometric fingerprinting much more complex. We introduce a new method 
for radiometric fingerprinting that detects the unique variations in the hardware of 
the reconfigurable radio by passively monitoring the radio packets. Several individ-
ual identifiers are used for extracting the unique physical characteristics of the radio, 
including the frequency offset, modulated phase offset, in-phasejquadrature-phase 
offset from the origin, and magnitude. Our method provides stable and robust iden-
tification by developing individual identifiers (classifiers) that may each be weak (i.e., 
incurring a high prediction error) but their committee can provide a strong classifi-
cation technique. Weighted voting method is used for combining the classifiers. Our 
hardware implementation and experimental evaluations over multiple radios demon-
strate that our weighted voting approach can identify the radios with an average of 
97.7% detection probability and an average of 2.3% probability of false alarm after 
testing only 5 frames. The probability of detection and probability of false alarms 
both rapidly improve by increasing the number of test frames. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Rapid technological advances in wireless communication has enabled the transition 
from low content rate voice and telephony usage to high data rate seamless multi-
media and interactive Internet applications. Proliferation of embedded tether-less 
appliances and the growing number of users demand new methods for identification, 
coexistence, and management of radio devices. Wireless radio identification is typ-
ically performed using the digital identifiers or keys. For example, cryptographic 
methods actively control accessing the device using the key-exchange protocols, or IP 
addresses are used for passively tracking the user access. While such methods pro-
vide the required level protection for many applications, they may be vulnerable for a 
number of applications, in particular when users have physical access to the devices. 
Vulnerabilities include extraction of digital keys by side-channel attacks, or replaying 
the IPs. To ensure identification certainty, a suit of radiometric fingerprinting meth-
ods that rely on unclonable minute variations of the physical radio were proposed 
in [4-12]. 
To manage the multiplicity of devices and address the growing application demand 
for higher bandwidth, innovative and complex radio technologies that can more effi-
ciently use the available radio spectrum are being developed. The emerging cognitive 
radio (CR) engines sense the bandwidth and other physical layer properties and then 
use the sensed data to make intelligent situation-aware decisions about their opera-
tion. The CR is able to adaptively adjust its physical and link layer parameters thus, 
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is typically more complex than most of the radios presently in operation and use. 
This thesis presents the first comprehensive study and llew methods for radio-
metric fingerprinting of the CR devices. Radiometric fingerprinting based on tran-
sient signal analysis has been widely studied for electromagnetic characteristics and 
antenna-level correlation and properties. Recent work has demonstrated that radio-
metric identification can be done more accurately by differentiating the characteristics 
of the individual wireless frames in the modulation domain [11]. It is possible to fur-
ther ameliorate the radio identification accuracy by employing symbol-based frame 
analysis and improved statistical classification methods [12]. 
The scope of the currently available radio identification techniques is limited to a 
single radio adjustment. The variable nature of the cognitive radio with multiple levels 
of parameters and adjustments renders the radiometric fingerprinting much more 
complex. For example, the error magnitude of the transmitted signal is commonly 
used as a metric for device identification. However, it is not clear if this value remains 
the same for different transmission power levels and various frequencies. While we 
initially study the modulation domain properties in the channel emulator environment 
where the channel impact is masked, our analysis also includes validation of the 
identifiers in indoor office environment. 
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Chapter 2 
Related Work 
In this chapter, a brief survey of related literature is provided which has influenced and 
inspired this work. Signal detection and identification source of an emitted signal is 
one the most challenging problems in wireless communication due to the broadcasting 
nature of the wireless communication which poses critical security threats. 
The early research in signal detection and identification of an emitted signal goes 
back to 1960's where finding the source of a radar signal in military has been of the 
utmost importance. Several methods such as Special Emitter Identification (SEI) 
and Special Emitter Verification (SEV) techniques are developed for identifying and 
verifying the source of a received signaL While SEI technique [13,14] identifies source 
of a signal by matching the received waveform to unique emitter, SEV technique 
[13, 14] is used for verification of the transmitter by looking at the external features 
of the signal where there is a priori knowledge of the transmitter. In these methods, 
identification is performed by measuring the unique features of the received signal, 
then these unique features are compared and mapped to existing clusters. Similar 
techniques are employed for also combating against fraud in cellular network [15,16]. 
The importance of identifying source of a signal has been amplified with the 
emergence of wireless communication. During the past decade, with the help of vast 
advances in Integrated Circuit (IC) technology, the use of wireless devices in daily life 
has increased dramatically. Pervasive use of wireless devices and broadcasting nature 
of the wireless communication necessitate a secure medium for communication. In [17] 
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a risk analysis of threats for wireless communication is provided according to their 
implemcntation difficulty and potcntial impact on wireless network. Among these 
threats, impersonation attack is listed as one of the most critical attacks due to 
its ease of implementation by using off-the-shelf equipment. Various forms of this 
attack exist such as device cloning, address spoofing, unauthorized access and replay 
attacks. For instance, an attacker could spoof one of the device identities in wireless 
communication, MAC (Media Access Control) address, and use MAC address to 
access a network. This attack could be prevented by using cryptographic protocols, 
namely public-key cryptography. Public-key cryptography algorithms are effectively 
used for providing security and authentication mechanisms for wired networks. Yet 
implementation of this method has severe disadvantages for wireless networks. Public-
key algorithms perform computationally heavy operations which will consume a lot 
of power and require considerable processing power. But most of the wireless devices 
are operating on battery power which makes battery life a critical issue for these 
devices. Also public-key algorithms require a key management infrastructure which 
incurs an overhead. For these reasons, lightweight and passive security mechanisms 
are needed for device identification in wireless networks. 
A large body of work exists for identifying devices in wireless networks and these 
methods can be grouped into two classes based on their identification mechanism: 
location based identification, radio-frequency (RF) fingerprinting. 
2.1 Location Based Identification 
The wireless link between a transmitter and receiver depends on frequency, time and 
space therefore it is unique for a communication pair. Location based identification 
mechanisms [18-22] utilize the properties of this unique connection to identify devices. 
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Faria et a1. [18] employ the received signal strength (RSS) for identification of 
devices. RSS is the measure for signal strength of received frame and depends on the 
power of the signal, wireless channel and distance between devices. Therefore, RSS 
values are unique for each transmitter and they cannot be forged by the attacker. 
Authors generate signalprints by using RSS values to identify devices and implement 
several attacks for IEEE 802.11 networks. Finally, they show that proposed signal-
prints can detect intruders with high probability. 
In [20], authors use off-the-shelf air monitors (AM) to detect spoofing attacks. RSS 
of frames are captured via AMs and modeled as Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM). 
GMM is proposed to distinguish between two signals from different transmitters which 
have frequency and spatial variation of multipath channel at the receiver. Authors 
propose an expectation-maximization algorithm based on RSS profiles. They test 
their algorithm with 20 AMs and report 3% false positive and up to 98.7% detection 
rate. 
Li et a1. [22] analyze multi-path effects of the wireless channel for identification. 
Their method relies on the fact that the channel between transmitter and receiver will 
show unique properties. Authors propose authentication and confidentiality schemes 
on USRP /GNURadio SNR platform and show that they can detect spoofing attacks. 
In [19], a robust location distinction mechanism is proposed by exploiting physical 
layer characteristic of the radio channel between a transmitter and a receiver. A 
temporal link signature, which is the sum of the effects of the multiple paths from 
the transmitter to the receiver, each with its own time delay and complex amplitude, 
is generated. Authors show that the signature changes with the device location and 
can be used to identify transmitters. 
Chen et a1. [21] propose a method which relies on an attack detector based on 
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statistical testing of RSS values. An attack is detected by looking at the distances 
between centroids obtained via K-means cluster of RSS data. Authors evaluate their 
method both on Wi-Fi and 802.15.4 (Zigbee) networks and show that their method 
can achieve 95% of detection rate and less than 5% false positive rate. 
Although location based identification methods provide a mechanism for identify-
ing different transmitters, the major shortcomings of these methods are that devices 
are assumed stable at one location and the probability of detection is highly dependent 
on distance of the devices. 
2.2 Radio-frequency Fingerprinting 
RF fingerprinting methods are based on physical properties of the devices for iden-
tification. Device identification by the unique variations in the physical properties 
has been subject of research in integrated circuits. The work in [23J uses the delay 
variation of CMOS logic components to extract a digital secret. The properties of 
reconfigurable platforms are used in [24] to build a secure and robust authentica-
tion system based on the present delay variations. A post-fabrication nondestructive 
gate-level characterization for Ie identification is also presented in [25J. Similarly, 
RF fingerprinting methods rely on the hardware imperfections inherited during the 
fabrication to uniquely identify wireless devices. Due to the manufacturing variabil-
ity, devices have minute imperfections which will cause deviations in the transmitted 
signals. These deviations are hard to model and forge therefore they can be used for 
device identification. 
In one of the early works [4], the electromagnetic (EM) signal transmitted by 
different WLAN (wireless local area network) cards is analyzed and shown that they 
have distinct properties due to manufacturing variability and antenna topology. The 
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authors investigate EN! signals from 6 different card and able to generate a unique 
signature for each card. 
Gerdes et al. [5] use a different approach and utilize matched filter to generate 
profiles based on signal to noise ratio (SNR) with the Gaussian noise presence. They 
show that by using a conventional matched filter, transmitters can be uniquely iden-
tified. 
A large body of work exists in the literature [6-10] which utilizes the transient 
behavior of the wireless devices. A transient behavior is the anomaly observed when a 
device changes its state, such as activation or turn-on. This behavior is characteristic 
to each device and related with the components (Le. phase-Iock-Ioop (PLL), modula-
tors, amplifiers, antennas) of the device. An RF fingerprint is generated by detecting 
and extracting the transient signal. First, signal is captured and initial point of the 
transient is detected. Then a fingerprint is generated by extracting the features of 
the transient signal. Features of the transient signal can be extracted by investigat-
ing instantaneous phase and amplitude of the received signal. The key part of this 
method relies on detecting the transient which is challenging due to noise present 
in the received signal. Therefore, transition point from noise to transient should be 
corrpetly identifipd for llniqup idpntification of devices. In [6,7], a Bayesian detector 
is used for estimating the starting point of the transient. Received signal is assumed 
to have two different gaussian distribution, one for noise and the other for transient 
signal. The transition from noise to transient then estimated by looking at the drastic 
changes in mean and the variance which can be detected by using Bayesian detector. 
In [10], authors use the variance trajectory of instantaneous amplitude and phase for 
transient detection. They extract power spectral density fingerprints and use spec-
tral correlation for classification. Finally they report 80% detection accuracy of their 
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experiments with 3 devices by collecting 802.11a OFDM signals. Tekbas et al. [9] 
investigate the effects of environmental conditions (i.e. power and temperature) on 
RF fingerprinting methods. Authors use variance dimensions for detecting transient 
signal, then probabilistic neural network (PNN) method is used for classification. 10 
difl"erent VHF radio transmitters are tested by varying the power and temperature. 
Results show that fingerprints are susceptible to change of environment. 
A different and recent met hod is proposed which uses modulation domain features 
by Brik et al. [11] instead of using transients for radio-frequency fingerprinting. Au-
thors claim that transmitters can be uniquely identified by looking at deviations of 
emitted signal from ideal I/Q plane. The main reasons for the deviations from ideal 
I/Q domain are channel effect, noise at the receiver and hardware imperfections. 
Hardware imperfections are related with the manufacturing variability of devices and 
can be used for identifying transmitters uniquely. Authors propose using five ra-
diometric identity metrics based on deviations for identification. The metrics for 
identification process are as follows: frequency error, SYNC correlation, I/Q offset, 
magnitude error and phase error. Finally authors use machine learning algorithms for 
classification of transmitters according to these metrics. K-nearest neighbor (kNN) 
and supporting vector machines (SVM) are implemented for classification. Authors 
perform experiments with identical 130 NIC (network interface card) cards and show 
that their method can differentiate transmitters with 99% accuracy. 
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Chapter 3 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter, first a background information will be provided about cognitive radios. 
Then our experiment platform, Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP), 
will be introduced briefly. 
3.1 Cognitive Radios 
Ever increasing usage of mobile wireless devices and temporal-spatial inefficieny of us-
ing licensed spectrum necessitate a paradigm shift for wireless communication. Cur-
rently, wireless spectrum is controlled via fixed spectrum assignment policy, which 
assigns the portions of the spectrum to licensed users. Yet, Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) reports [1] show that fixed assignment policy is inefficient due to 
temperal and spatial variations which is also depicted in Figure 3.1. A dynamic access 
of spectrum is required as the spectrum, which is the lifeline for wireless communi-
catioll, is utilized inefficiently. Initiatives have been taken such as, next generation 
networks which is also called Dynamic Spectrum Access network for implementing 
policy based intelligent radios is proposed by DARPA [26, 27]. Most recently, FCC 
announces [28] opening up TV white spaces for mobile devices on unlicensed basis. 
The key enabling technology for the initiatives is cognitive radio (CR), which is 
capable of sharing the spectrum in an opportunistic manner. CR concept is first 
proposed by J. Mitola [29] where it is defined as a software-defined radio which can 
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Figure 3.1 : Spectrum Utilization [1] 
adjust its parameters depending on the spectrum status. The ultimate goal of CR is 
to determine best available spectrum without interfering the licensed users. Sharing 
the spectrum with the primary users poses a challenge which requires CR to be always 
aware of its environment and to find the temporarily unused portions of the spectrum, 
which is called spectrum hole or white spaces [2] as shown in Figure 3.2. Thus, main 
functionalities of CR can be listed as follows [30]: 
• Finding white spaces and sharing it without interfering with primary users 
(Spectrum sensing) 
• Determining the best available spectrum to meet communication requirements 
(Spectrum management) 
• Continuation of seamless communication during a transition to another white 
space (Spectrum mobility) 
• Sharing the available white space with other CR users (Spectrum sharing) 
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Figure 3.2 : Spectrum hole [2] 
As of today, a number of different CR hardware platforms have been proposed. 
Most of the case, architectures rely on an versatility of an FPGA device to enable 
reconfigurability and flexibility of the platform. A rnulti-FPGA testbed for physical 
and network layers of CR is proposed in [31,32]. A multiprocessor system-on-chip 
(MPSoC) design is introduced in [33], in which a system level design methodology is 
adopted to map a CR on a platform. 
3.2 Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) 
Wireless Open-Access Research Platform (WARP) [3] is a scalable and extensible 
programmable platform designed for prototyping and implementing wireless networks. 
WARP is an open-access research platform which enables sharing and exchanging 
wireless network architectures for developing next-generation wireless networks. As 
of today, WARP has been adopted in more than 50 research groups and is one of the 
most widely used platform in wireless network research [3]. 
The WARP Platform is composed of four parts: platform support packages, open-
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access repository, research applications and custom hardware [34]. Platform support 
packages contain design tools for hardware/software design and open-access repository 
is a collection of the source codes and hardware design files. Algorithm implementa-
tions via WARP Platform are shared via research applications. 
The custom hardware consists of 3 main components: an FPGA Board, Radio 
Boards and Clock Board. A fully equipped WARP hardware kit is presented in Fig-
ure 3.3. Hardware platform is centered around Virtex-II Pro FPGA Board which is 
depicted on Figure 3.4. The FPGA board has both configurable logic blocks (CLB) 
and PowerPC cores. While real-time Digital Signal Processing (DSP) applications 
which require high-speed communication are implemented by CLB's, PowerPC cores 
are used for executing network layer protocols developed in C and providing flexible 
interface between physical (PHY) and Media Access Control (MAC) layer. Radio 
Board are integrated to FPGA Board via daughtercard slots. The Radio Board 
supports 2.4 and 5 GHz ISM/UNII bands and capable of performing wideband appli-
cations such as OFDM. Clock Board provides clock signal to all boards and contains 
2 parts. First part generates signal for radio boards, while second part supplies the 
signal for FPGA logic and analog converters. 
3.2.1 WARPLab 
Our experiments are performed with WARP FPGA Boards and WARP Lab frame-
work. WARPLab is a non-real time communication framework designed for rapid 
physical layer prototyping [3]. The framework uses MATLAB and WARP FPGA 
Board interactively. WARP boards are controlled via MATLAB workspace where 
user can generate signals, then these signals are transmitted by WARP boards. While 
wireless communication is done in real time by transmitting signal on the air, all 
Figure 3.3 : WARP Kit 
RS-232 UART JTAG/USB ZBTSRAM 
Duaghtercard 
Slots 
10/100 
Ethernet 
Multi-Gigabit 
Transceivers 
Figure 3.4 : WARP Hardware Platform 
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the data processing is perforrned off-line with NIATLAB. The de ign flow for the 
WARPLab is shown in Figure 3.5. First , signal is generated in the MATLAB by user, 
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then generated signal is sent to WARP board via Ethernet. WARP board downloads 
thc signal and storcs in its buffcr. Once trigger signal is sent, WARP board sends the 
signal in the air and receiver board captures the signal in real time and stores in the 
buffer. Finally, captured signal is sent to 1VIATLAB for processing via Ethernet. 
WARP node 
Figure 3.5 : WARPLab Design Flow [3] 
The hardware architecture of the WARPLab is composed of two parts, transmit-
ter and receiver, which is presented in Figure 3.6. In the transmitter part , signal 
is received via Ethernet and stored in Tx J/Q buffers. Then signal is converted to 
analog by Digital to Analog J/Q Converters (DAC) , and analog signal is amplified 
with Transmitter Base-I3and Amplifiers. Baseband signal is up converted to RF sig-
nal through Phase-Locked Loop (PLL). Finally, up converted signal is arnplified with 
Transmitter RF amplifiers. All the parameters for Base-Band Amplifier, PLL and RF 
~:tInplifiers are aujustable anu can bc sct by USCI' within 1VIATLAB. For the receiver 
part, first signal is captured on the air, then it goes through Receiver RF arnplifier. 
The RF signal is downconverted to baseband signal via PLL, then the signal strength 
is adjusted with Receiver Base-Band Amplifiers. Finally, analog signal is converted 
to digital by Analog to Digital J/Q (ADC) converters and stored in the Receiver 
J/Q Buffers. The values then send to MATLAB via Ethernet for fnrther processing. 
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Like transmitter part, all the parameters for Receiver Base-Band Amplifier , PLL and 
Rcccivcr RF aInplificr can bc controlled by user. Rcceiver part also has a Received 
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), which measures the signal strength of the signal. 
Radio Board 
FPGA 
WARPLab Sysgen Core 
Figure 3.6 : WARPLab Architecture [3] 
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Chapter 4 
Classifying Variables 
In this chapter, we introduce our classifiers first which will be integral part of our 
fingerprinting mechanism. These classifiers will be used later in Chapter 5 to gen-
erate signatures for cognitive radio devices. Experiment setup which is used during 
classifier extraction will be explained next. Finally the response of classifiers for dif-
ferent cognitive radio configurations (i.e. modulation, power and frequency) will be 
analyzed. 
4.1 Classifiers 
To authenticate a wireless device in a network, a signature that can uniquely identify 
each device is needed. Various signature extraction methods are proposed and used 
for network security but we are interested in a signature scheme based on the unique 
RF signal characteristics of a device. A signature can be generated for each device 
by extracting its specific information from the transmitted signal via processing the 
received signal in the modulation domain. The extracted information will be defined 
as our classifiers and for the rest of this work, the terms classifiers and identifiers will 
be used interchangeably. 
Our classifiers will be based on the deviation of the signals from the ideal signal 
on modulation domain. Due to manufacturing variability of the hardware and com-
munication channel, received signals in the receiver end will be different than ideal 
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signal. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the variation of received signal from different boards. 
Signals frorn different radios behave differently and fonn a distinctively different clus-
ters . Even the very same board acts differently with the changing power which is 
presented in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. 
RX SIGNAL RADIO 3 
90 4 
270 
RX SIGNAL RAD IO 7 
90 2 
.. 0 
RX SIGNAL RADIO 5 
90 1 
.. 0 
270 
RX SIGNAL RADIO 9 
90 0.5 
o 
o 
270 
Figure 4.1 : Received signal from different boards 
Thus, to extract the hidden information related to hardware variability, we will 
define our classifiers based on Error Vector Measurements (EVM) , I/Q offset and 
frequency offset. EVM is widdy used rnethod for testing the quality of the communi-
cation systems [35]. The method analyzes deviations in the received signal to identify 
source of these distortions such as communication medium, noise and hardware im-
perfections of devices for troubleshooting. 
EVM measurements are performed in the modulation domain. Received and ideal 
signal are defined as a phasor in I/Q domain. Error vector is then defined as the 
Board 2, PWR LVL 1 
90 1 
270 
Board 2, PWR LVL 2 
90 1 
120 60 
270 
Board 2, PWR LVL 3 
90 1 
270 
Figure 4.2 Received signal for different power levels (BPSK) 
Board 10, PWR LVL 1 
90 1 
270 
Board 10, PWR LVL 2 
90 1 
270 
Board 10, PWR LVL 3 
90 1 
270 
Figure 4. 3 Received signal for different power levels (QPSK) 
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magnitude of the distance vector between received signal and ideal signal vector 
which is also shown in Figure 4.4. Other metrics based on error vector can be defined 
as follows: 
• Magnitude Error: Magnitude difference between received signal and ideal 
signal phasor. 
• Phase Error: Angular difference between received signal and ideal signal pha-
SOL 
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• Error Vector Magnitude: Scalar distance between received and ideal signal 
phasor. 
Q 
Received Symbol 
Ideal Symbol 
I 
Figure 4.4 : Error vector magnitude (EVM) 
These metrics will be used as our identifiers along with J/Q offset and frequency 
offset to generate fingerprints for WARP boards. 
• I/Q Offset: The distance between the origin of the J/Q domain (0 ) and origin 
of the received signal (0') which is shown in Figure 4.5. 
• Frequency Offset: Frequency difference between transmitted carrier signal 
and ideal carrier signal. 
We choose two different modulation types in our experiments, differential BPSK 
and QPSK, to analyze the effects of Illodulation. Since EV1!l related classifiers are 
defined per symbol, two modulations will have different number of classifiers . 
120 
90 
I 
I 
I 
I 
..... I 
.... I 
o 
180 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~9~l~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
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I ..... A
270 
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I 330 
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Figure 4.5 : I/Q Offset 
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o 
• BPSK: Total of 8 classifiers: 2 Phase Error, 2 NIagnitude Error, 2 Error Vector 
Magnitude, 1 I/Q Offset , 1 Frequency Offset 
• QPSK: Total of 14 classifiers: 4 Phase Error, 4 ~Iagnitude Error, 4 Error Vector 
Magnitude, 1 I/Q Offset, 1 Frequency Offset 
4 .2 Experiment Setup 
Our signature scheme is based on the deviations of the transmitted signal due to 
hardware imperfections of transmitters. Therefore, channel effects and environment 
noise in the translnitted signal should be elinlinated first to ob erve only hardware 
effect. For this purpose, Spirent SR5500 Wireless Channel Emulator is employed in 
the experiments and wireless link between transmitter and receiver is set to static 
channel to eliminate possible channel effects. WARPLab reference design [3], which 
is used for prototyping physical layer algorithms, handles the communication. While 
WARP boards are employed for real time communication, MATLAB is used for off-
21 
line signal processing. 
Our experiment setup is presented in Figure 4.6. Transmitter and receiver nodes 
are connected to each other via channel emulator 's input and output connections. The 
Ethernet switch is used to connect WARP boards and PC. We use 12 WARP boards 
to simulate different CR transmitter nodes trying to communicate with a common 
receiver node. 
. ........................................ . 
. ::.; ...... ' .... ~ .... -;;;;.:::::::::: 
Figure 4.6 : Experiment Setup 
To simulate a cognitive radio device, we choose different channel , power and mod-
ulation configurations which are listed as follows: 
• Channel: 4 WLAN channels (1, 2 ,4 and 8) 
• Power: 3 power settings (low, medium and high) 
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• Modulation: BPSK and QPSK 
In each configuration, 200 frames each of which contains 2002 random symbols are 
generated and processed in MATLAB. Processed data is transferred to transmitter 
node via the Ethernet and then transmitted through the communication medium via 
WARP board. Receiver node captures the transmitted signal and sends back captured 
data to PC via the Ethernet for further processing in MATLAB. In addition, carrier 
frequencies of the signal is monitored via Agilent ESA series spectrum analyzer to 
compute frequency offset. 
4.3 Classifier Analysis 
In the following chapter we will propose a signature scheme for a cognitive radio device 
operating on over a range of frequencies, power levels, and modulation parameters 
based on aforementioned classifiers. Therefore, the relationship between parameters 
and classifiers should be investigated first. 
Before going into further discussions, we illustrate a few samples of our visual 
data analysis. The significance of this phase is that no pattern recognition software 
has been so far able to match the human pattern recognition ability [36]. The visual 
trends typically provide a sound guideline on how to organize the experiments and 
the classifier sensitivity. Boxplots and histograms will be used for identifying visual 
trends. 
A boxplot is a convenient way of graphically depicting groups of numerical data 
through their five-number summaries (the smallest observation, lower quartile, me-
dian, upper quartile, and the largest observation). Boxplot also indicates which ob-
servations, if any, might be considered as outliers. It provides a fast method for visual 
comparison of the density functions and outlier detection. 
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A histogram on the other hand, approximates the probability density function 
(pdf), assuming that we normalize the number of values in each bin to the total num-
ber of elements (assuming equidistance bins). Figure 4.7 illustrates estimated the 
probability distribution of different classifiers via histograms. In addition, gamma 
and normal distribution fittings of histograms are displayed in the figure. We opt to 
use these fitting functions instead of histogranls since all the histogram data could 
be stored 8."l distribution fitting parameters (Le. mean and median for normal dis-
tribution). We choose gamma distribution to represent pdf of the classifiers since it 
provides a better fit than normal distribution for all the classifiers. 
For the following subsections we will look at trends of each classifier with 3 sets 
of plots. First set will be boxplots to observe the difference between boards. Second 
and third sets will be histograms for different power levels and channels to analyze 
the corresponding effect on each board. 
4.3.1 Phase Error 
Figure 4.8 presents boxplot diagrams of Phase Error (PE) for different configurations. 
It can be seen that with the exception of board 12, all boards tend to show similar 
behavior which makes PE our 'weakest' classifier. The frequency response of the PE 
is shown in Figure 4.9 via probability distribution functions (pdf) estimated by the 
gamma probability distribution. For different channels, PE shows little variation. 
Yet for different power levels, PE acts differently. Figure 4.10 shows the difference of 
pdfs with different power levels. As the power increases, the pdf tends to spread out 
which is closely related to the behavior of the boards represented in Figure 4.2 and 
4.3. In these figures, it can be seen that with the increase in the power more symbols 
deviate from the cluster center, which explains the spread in pdfs for different power 
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levels. 
4.3.2 Magnitude Error 
Magnitude Error (ME) classifier performs better than PE which can be observed 
from boxplots in Figure 4.11. vVe can see slight difIerence between the boards yet 
the patterns are similar. The frequency response of ME difIers for each channel but 
the difIerence is very small as can he ohserv(xl in Figure 4.12. With difIerent power 
levels, ME shows similar behavior with PE which is presented in Figure 4.13. As 
the power increases more symbols deviate from cluster center thus magnitude error 
increases which causes the spread out in the pdfs. 
4.3.3 Error Vector Magnitude 
Error Vector Magnitude (EVM) classifier shows similar characteristics with ME. Box-
plots in Figure 4.14 illustrates the same trend as in ME. Frequency response of EVM 
is quite stable for difIerent channels which is presented in Figure 4.1S. With the in-
creasing power, deviation of the symbols from the cluster center increases the EVM 
value, so same spread out in the EVM pdfs can be observed in Figure 4.16. 
4.3.4 I/Q Offset 
I/Q OfIset values for each board presented III Figure 4.17. Like other classifiers, 
I/Q OfIset pdfs for difIerent frequencies behave similarly as can be seen from Figure 
4.18. I/Q OfIset values increase with high transmission power which can be seen from 
Figure 4.19. Increase in the power causes more symbols to spread out, which in turn 
increases the distance between origins of the received symbols. 
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4.3.5 Frequency Offset 
Frequency offset, which can be inferred from Figure 4.20, is the best performing 
classifier among all the classifiers. The boxplots of the boards show variations in 
terms of shape and magnitude which are completely different from other classifiers. 
For different channels, frequency offset tends to be constant as in Figure 4.21. Unlike 
other classifiers, frequency offset is immune to change in power and stays almost 
constant as illustrated in Figure 4.22. 
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Chapter 5 
Classification 
In this chapter, we will introduce our fingerprinting mechanism for cognitive radios. 
First, flow of the mechanism will be explained. Then a new classification method will 
be proposed for signature generation. Finally the performance of the classification 
method will be analyzed for both static channel and in-door office environment. 
5.1 Fingerprinting Mechanism 
In this section, we will use the classifying variables described in Chapter 4 to build 
a statistical model for each of the classifiers. Figure 5.1 shows the overall flow of 
our signature extraction (learning phase) and signature matching (testing phase) 
method. Signature extraction process (demonstrated on the upper row on Figure 
5.1) for each radio can be defined as follows. First, a predefined number of training 
message frames are generated then transmitted by each radio card. Next, we define 
the single characteristics (Gm ) that can be used to identify source of the messages. 
We use data-driven density formation and pdf distance metrics for representing and 
computing each Gm . As we mentioned earlier, each of the characteristics would be a 
weak classifier in the sense that we may get a high prediction error. The last step in 
signature extraction is to combine the results of the M classifiers. We select weighted 
voting as the committee formation method. Our reason for this choice is the simplicity 
and good performance of this method compared to other alternatives [37]. 
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The signature matching phase (shown on the lower row on Figure 5.1) is much 
simpler. Upon arrival of a batch of F frames , the characteristics of the frames are 
evaluated against the M single classifier 's extracted signatures. Next we combine the 
results of the M classifiers. T he result would be identification of the radio source of 
the incoming batch of signals. 
Learning phase 
or signature 
extraction 
phase 
Testing 
phase or 
signature 
matching phase 
Data 
gathering 
overK 
radios 
Testing F 
frames 
from one 
radio 
--
... 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
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Learning M single classifiers 
Smgle classifier Gj 1 Build a 
Smgle classifier G, 1-----. committee 
• ofM • 
• classifiers 
• Single classifier GM I 
Test the M classifiers 
--.cRadio 1? 
Classifier Gj I Test the ~Radi02? Classifier G2 I~ committee I-
• ofM 
• • 
• classifiers • 
• .... Classifier GM I --.cRadio K? 
Figurr, 5.1 The flow of signature extraction and signature matching approach. 
5.1.1 Signature Extraction 
For the signature extraction phase (learning phase) we choose random 100 frames 
for the training set among the 200 frames transmitted which is explained in Section 
4.2 (Remaining frames will be used later for testing phase). For each classifier, first 
histogram data is generated, then the data is used to estimate probability density 
function (pdf) with gamma distribution parameters, namely scale and shape param-
eters . After fon ning the training set, we look at the weak classification using a single 
classifier. Randomly chosen frames are tested wit h t he training set to find probability 
detection (PD ) and probability of false alarm (PFA ) fo r each classifier. The pdf of 
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the test frame and training set is compared to identify the source of the signal. We 
perform the comparison via distance/similarity measures between two pdfs, namely 
test frame and training set. Kullback-Leibner (KL) divergence (Equation 5.1) is cho-
sen as our metric for measuring the distance between two pdfs. Since KL divergence 
is non-symmetric we will use dKL = dKL(PIIQ) + dKL(QIIP) as our distance metric 
which is symmetric. 
(5.1) 
PD and PF A of each classifier are then computed as follows: first we choose a 
random frame transmitted from one board as test frame, then distance between the 
test frame and training set is evaluated via KL divergence. Figure 5.2 presents a 
simple scenario for the distance computation for the frequency offset classifier. Board 
8 is selected as the target device and a sample frame is chosen from corresponding 
training set. Sample frame is then compared with the training set of several boards. 
Only four training sets are displayed for brevity. It is trivial to identify visually the 
source of the signal as board 8. Also, the distance measurements from each training 
set which are given in Table 5.1 confirms the source of the signal as board 8, since it 
has the minimum distance to sample among all boards. 
Based on KL distance metric we define PD and PF A as follows: 
• PDi = P[DiIHi], given a test frame is transmitted from board i (Hi)' training 
set of board i has the minimum distance (Di) with the test frame . 
• PFAi = P[DiIHk], given a test frame is transmitted from board k (Hk), training 
set of board i has the minimum distance (Di) with test frame where i =f:. k. 
4.5 
c 4 
o 
~ 3.5 
:::l 
u.. 
C 3 
·00 
~ 2.5 
o 
g 2 
:0 
~ 1.5 
o 
tt 
0.5 
o~~~--~----=---2000 2500 3000 
Frequency Offset 
- Board 8 
- Board 9 
- Board 11 
Board 12 
- Board 8 (Test) 
3500 4000 
Figure 5.2 : Probability density function of frequency offset classifier 
B8 Bg Bn B12 
KL dist 0.005 0.401 0.856 0.163 
Table 5.1 : KL distance of boards 
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We evaluate the PD and PFA values of each classifier for each configuration by 
choosing random frames from the test set and comparing with the training set. Table 
5.2 presents PD and PF A values for BPSK modulation. Each column represents BPSK 
classifiers which are listed from column 2 to 9 as : Phase Error over symbol 0 and 1, 
Magnitude Error over symbol 0 and 1, Error Vector Magnitude over symbol 0 and 1, 
I/Q Offset and Frequency Off et . We note that all classifiers excep t frequency offset 
have low PD and high PFA values which provides a weak means of prediction. This is 
an expected result since in Chapter 4 we show that boards have similar distribution 
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for PE, ME, EVM and J/Q Offset. vVe also note that values in these tables are 
average values for all power and frequency configurations. 
PEo PEl MEo MEl EVMo EVMl I/Q FREQ 
PD 57.1 58.9 68.6 68.7 63.6 63.8 63.7 94.3 
PPA 42.9 41.1 31.4 31.3 36.4 36.3 36.3 5.7 
Table 5.2 : PD and PF A for BPSK identifiers 
PD and Pp A values for QPSK modulation are also presented in Table 5.3. Table 
format is similar to BPSK tables but PE, ME and EVM are defined over four symbols 
instead of two. PD values of frequency offset is still better than rest of the classi-
fiers and also it has low PF A values compared to the rest of classifiers. Both tables 
demonstrate that frequency offset is the best single classifier among all the classifiers. 
PEo PEl PE2 PE3 MEo MEl ME2 ME3 EVMo EVMl EVM2 EVM3 I/Q FREQ 
PD 33.7 34.4 34.4 33.8 66.6 66.3 66.0 66.8 67.4 66.9 66.8 67.8 63.1 93.8 
PFA 66.3 65.6 65.6 66.2 33.4 33.7 34.0 33.3 32.6 33.1 33.2 32.3 36.9 6.3 
Table 5.3 : PD and PF A for QPSK identifiers 
5.1.2 Combining Classifiers 
The last step of our procedure is to combine the several weak classifiers computed 
earlier to form one stronger committee of the classifiers. To make the committee, 
our first method is to perform a weighted voting. In weighted voting, we find the 
probability of detection for each of the classifiers Gm , m = 1, ... , M. Next, we 
assign normalized weights am to each weak classifier Gm based on its probability of 
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detection that can be learned by using standard statistical validation methods. In 
such validation methods, the probability of detection can be found during the learning 
phase by setting aside a part of the learn data and then testing the prediction ability 
of the built signature from the first part of the data on the second part of the data (the 
set aside part) [36J. The normalization is such that the sum of the weights is 1, Le., 
E;';;=l am = 1. In our evaluations, we find the non-normalized value of am, denoted 
by a~ using the following formula for each of our weak classifiers Gm , m = 1, ... , M: 
(5.2) 
where PD(Gm (.)) is the average probability of detection (derived using the statistical 
validation methods) for the weak classifier Gm over all the radios and PFA(Gm (.)) 
is the average probability of false alarm computed like PD(Gm (.)). am can be easily 
found by normalizing the a~s. 
We will have total of 24 set of um's, one for each power, frequency and modulation 
configuration. Table 5.4 and 5.5 shows the effects of varying frequency and power on a 
values for BPSK and QPSK modulation. Rows of the tables represent the classifiers 
for each modulation. Columns 2 to 4 show the a values for different power levels 
for channell, while columns 4 to 7 represent the a values for different channels on 
high power setting. It can be observed from these tables that changing power on the 
same channel changes the a values dramatically. The weights of frequency offset and 
J/Q Offset start decreasing with increasing power level. This behavior is related the 
observations made in Chapter 4 where we show the signal characteristics of boards in 
Figure 4.2 and 4.3. Signals transmitted with low power form more uniform clusters 
which decreases the contribution of EVM related classifiers, yet with the increasing 
power levels, clusters change its shape and form rather unique formation. Thus, 
increasing power results in different EVM results which in turn decrease the weights 
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of frequency offset and I/Q Offset. This behavior is discussed also in Section 4.3, 
where each board acts different for power levels shown from their pdfs. Changing the 
channel for same power setting on the other hand, does not result in critical change on 
a values which confirms the observations made in Section 4.3 where pdf's of classifiers 
tend to stay same with changing frequency for the same power level. 
To form the committee, we also map the classification results from each weak 
classifier to a value in the set {-I, I}. If the weak classifier Gm identifies the radio Rl 
as the transmitter, then Gm(Rl) = 1, otherwise, Gm(Rl) = -1. Let Gvote denote the 
final voting function for a radio. The following voting function is used for weighting 
the votes of the different classifiers for one radio Rk : 
(5.3) 
The radio with the highest Gvote would be selected to be the target radio. In our 
experimental results, we compare the performance of our classifier against combining 
the results of the M classifiers by summing up their KL distances (Equation 5.4). 
This time, the radio Rk with the minimum KL distance (G M D) would be the target 
radio. 
(5.4) 
We present a simple case for voting and MD classifier for BPSK modulation in 
Table 5.6. Columns of the table represents weak classifiers identification for corre-
sponding board's test frame. Weak classifiers are listed between row 2 and 9, the 
final two rows correspond to decision of voting and lVID classifier. For boards 1, 3, 5 
and 6 hoth classifiers identify boards correctly as expected since majority of the weak 
classifiers detect the boards correctly. The results for boards 2, 4 and 7 are interesting 
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Cl,PL Cl,PM Cl,PH C2,PH C4,PH CS,PH 
PEo 0 0.083 0.105 0.090 0.088 0.027 
PEl 0 0.11 0.100 0.105 0.073 0.098 
MEo 0.077 0.141 0.160 0.138 0.177 0.192 
MEl 0.083 0.142 0.154 0.160 0.185 0.199 
EVMo 0.062 0.031 0.119 0.143 0.103 0.105 
EVMl 0.071 0.030 0.118 0.130 0.106 0.123 
[/Q 0.172 0.136 0.060 0.015 0.051 0.007 
FREQ 0.536 0.327 0.183 0.220 0.217 0.249 
Table 5.4 : a values for different configurations (BPSK) 
Cl'pL Cl'pM Cl,PH C2,PH C4,PH CS,PH 
PEo 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PEl 0 0 0 0.003 0 0 
PE2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PE3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MEo 0.022 0.064 0.112 0.106 0.109 0.114 
MEl 0.034 0.066 0.101 0.112 0.108 0.104 
ME2 0.051 0.054 0.107 0.108 0.112 0.106 
ME3 0.032 0.065 0.110 0.102 0.111 0.107 
EVMo 0.013 0.096 0.110 0.097 0.096 0.102 
EVMl 0.034 0.091 0.090 0.100 0.101 0.096 
EVM2 0.013 0.079 0.098 0.101 0.103 0.098 
EVM3 0.019 0.092 0.101 0.098 0.103 0.098 
[/Q 0.096 0.111 0.034 0.054 0.025 0.036 
FREQ 0.686 0.282 0.136 0.119 0.133 0.140 
Table 5.5 : a values for different configurations (QPSK) 
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to demonstrate the importance of voting-based classification. Majority of the weak 
classifiers produce false alarm for these boards. Yet, frequency offset and I/Q offset 
classifier identifies the boards correctly as they have a greater weight than rest of the 
classifiers. For this reason, voting based classifier could identify the boards correctly 
while MD based classifier fails to detect actual board. 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 
PEo 1 2 3 6 7 4 7 
PEl 4 4 3 6 2 4 7 
MEo 1 1 5 12 4 6 12 
MEl 1 1 5 12 5 6 12 
EVMo 1 1 5 12 5 9 12 
EVMl 1 1 2 12 5 6 12 
I/Q 1 2 3 4 9 5 7 
FREQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Gvote 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
GMD 1 1 3 12 5 6 12 
Table 5.6 : Voting Example for BPSK 
5.2 Performance of Classifiers 
We evaluate the performance of the classifiers by choosing 5 random frames from each 
board's test set and looking at the classifiers response. This procedure is repeated 
for 100 times to compute PD and PF A values for each configuration. Table 5.7 and 
5.8 present average PD and PF A values of two classifiers for all configurations with 
BPSK and QPSK modulation. 
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The results are really promising and clearly show the superior performance of the 
voting-based classifier. We have an average PD of 97.7% and 96.8% for BPSK and 
QPSK respectively; while average PFA is very low, only 2.3% and 3.1% for BPSK and 
QPSK. The results of the voting-based method clearly benefit from the frequency 
offset classifier which has much better prediction rate compared to other classifiers. 
As a result, this classifier gets a higher value for its weight CYm , providing accurate 
prediction. 
MD classifier on the other hand has 75.9% PD and 24.1% PFA for BPSK and 76.1% 
PD and 23.9% PFA for QPSK. These results confirm the effectiveness of weighting for 
generating stronger classifier. 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 BlO B11 B12 
Gvote(PD) 100 90.3 95.1 94.8 99.2 97.3 97.2 100 99.8 99.9 98.5 100 
GMD(PD) 79.5 65 76.5 66.5 74.5 73 90 89.5 76.5 62.5 57.5 100 
Gvote(PFA) 0.1 4.5 1.3 5.2 6.9 6.7 1.1 0 1.3 0 0.8 0 
GMD(PFA) 25.1 23.7 15.8 16.3 43.7 21.1 19.5 17.6 27.7 39.8 29.8 12.5 
Table 5.7 : Combining classifiers: Voting and ML (BPSK) 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 BlO B11 B12 
Gvote(PD) 99.3 92.5 96.7 96.8 87.1 96.2 99.3 100 96.3 100 98.5 100 
GMD(PD) 77.5 54 76 87.5 86 84.5 57 56 94.5 72.5 67.5 100 
Gvote(PFA) 0.8 4.8 10.6 3.8 1.8 7.8 2.7 0.5 2.5 0 2.2 0 
GMD(PFA) 19.3 16.3 26.7 16.4 20.5 14.1 29.5 21.7 10.2 21.8 31.4 6.4 
Tahle 5.8 : Comhining classifiers: Voting and NIL (QPSK) 
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5.2.1 Results with Office Environment 
To analyze the impact of the channel on our classification method, we perform same 
set of experiments with indoor office environment setting of the Channel Emulator. 
Unlike a static channel, indoor office environment will have big impact on transmitted 
signals. Fading and multi-path effects will be observed in the received signal which 
will cause further deviation from the ideal signal. Table 5.9 and 5.10 show the PD and 
PF A values of the classifiers in office environment for BPSK and QPSK modulation. 
As expected, EVM related classifiers, already weak in the static channel, are severely 
affected by the office environment. We observe low PD and high PF A rates compared 
to static channel for these classifiers. While I/Q Offset and frequency offset is resistant 
to channel impact and provide similar detection probability with static channel. 
PEo PEl MEo MEl EVMo EVMl I/Q FO 
PD 16.6 16.5 8.5 8.5 9.6 9.8 54.7 94.9 
PFA 83.4 83.5 91.5 91.5 90.4 90.2 45.3 5.1 
Table 5.9 : PD and PFA for BPSK identifiers 
PEo PEl PE2 PE3 MEo MEl ME2 ME3 EVMo EVMl EVM2 EVM3 I/Q FREQ 
PD 18.8 19 19 18.9 9.2 9.3 9.2 9.2 11.9 12.1 11.8 12 49.1 94.5 
PFA 81.3 81 81 81.1 90.8 90.8 90.8 90.8 88.1 87.9 88.2 88.0 50.9 5.5 
Table 5.10 : PD and PFA for QPSK identifiers 
The effect of the channel is manifested clearly all the EVM based classifiers which 
results low PD and high PFA for these classifiers. The weights of these classifiers (0: 
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values) will be lower than static channel weights, while weights of the I/Q Offset and 
frequency offset will increase compared to their static channel counterpart. 
Even with the indoor office environment weighted voting mechanism will be im-
mune to channel impacts. Table 5.7 and 5.12 present average PD and PF A values for 
the two classifiers. We have 96.6% and 95.9% detection rate for BPSK and QPSK 
respectively. Also PFA values are still low, only 3.4% and 4.1%. The identification 
rate slightly decreased with the channel presence, yet still we have a high PD values 
due to frequency offset classifier. The performance of the MD classification degrades 
with the channel presence. PD has dropped to 58.1% and 51.1% while PFA increased 
to 41.9% and 48.9% for BPSK and QPSK respectively, which further encourages us 
to use weighted-voting mechanism. 
Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 Bs Bg BlO Bn B12 
Gvote(PD) 93.1 100 95.8 96.9 96 90.9 100 98 95.8 96.5 97.5 99 
GMD(PD) 59.7 59.8 62.2 45.9 65.5 53.5 56.9 48.8 40.1 41.9 62.3 100 
Gvote(PFA) 2.5 8.7 1.7 1.3 8.5 7.1 2.5 3.3 0.2 2.3 1.7 0.7 
GMD(PFA) 52.6 43.3 37.3 44.1 45.6 46.8 38.2 40.4 45.2 39.4 40.3 30.3 
Table 5.11 : Combining classifiers: Voting and ML (BPSK) 
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Bl B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 Bs Bg BlO Bl1 B12 
Gvote(PD) 93.3 94.1 98.5 96.4 94.8 95.2 97.4 94.2 97.2 98.3 94.7 97.6 
GMD(PD) 45.3 39.4 37.9 42.7 50.7 50.1 52.2 47.3 38.4 45.5 64.3 99.7 
Gvote(PPA) 3.9 4.3 4.1 5.3 4.4 3.7 4.1 2.9 1.7 5.5 4.2 5.1 
GMD(PPA) 54.2 57.2 44.6 59.1 51.1 45.5 50.8 61.8 30.5 33.7 62.1 34.2 
Table 5.12 : Combining classifiers: Voting and ML (QPSK) 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
Ever increasing usage of wireless devices and inefficient utilization of wireless spec-
trum necessitate a paradigm shift in wireless communication. New technologies are 
emerging to use wireless spectrum more efficiently. Cognitive radio (CR) is one of 
the novel technologies that can adjust its parameters adaptively based on communi-
cation environment. Still broadcasting nature of wireless communication poses great 
threat for communication parties independent of the technologies. Many attacks has 
been listed in the past and impersonation (identity based) attacks is noted as one 
of the most critical ones due to its ease of implementation. Thus identification of a 
transmitted signal is one of the most challenging problems for securing wireless com-
munication. Previous research addressed identity based attacks and proposed counter 
measurement techniques to prevent these type of attacks. However, these techniques 
are hased on single radio adjnstment and will no longer he sufficient for CR devices 
due to its ability to reconfigure parameters based on the environment. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is no previous work on addressing the security issues for CR. 
This thesis provides first attempt to generate a robust fingerprinting mechanism for 
different environment settings and radio configurations to secure CR communication. 
We propose a signature scheme for identifying cognitive radio for different config-
urations (power, channel, modulation). Our signature scheme is based on the effects 
of the hardware imperfection on the transmitted signal. Due to manufacturing vari-
ability, devices have minute imperfections which cause deviations on the transmitted 
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signal. We analyze these deviations on the modulation domain to generate unique 
signatures for each device. We defiue classifying variables based on the characteristics 
of a signal in modulation domain which are listed as follows: Error Vector Magnitude 
(EVM) measurements based classifiers (phase error, magnitude error and EVM), I/Q 
Offset and frequency offset. 
We perform experiments with WARP platform and Channel Emulator. Reconfig-
urable WARP boards are employed to emulate CR and channel emulator is used to 
cancel out channel effects to observe only the hardware imperfections on the trans-
mitted signal. To simulate a possible CR activity, we choose different power, channel 
and modulation configurations. A predefined number of frames are transmitted from 
12 WARP boards for each configuration. Based on the transmitted frames, we look 
at the effects of changing parameters on our classifiers. Our analysis show that indi-
vidual classifiers are weak due to their high prediction error. 
Next, we propose a signature scheme to combine our weak classifiers to form a 
strong classification method. We choose weighted voting to form a committee. Each 
classifier assigned a weight based on its probability of detection (PD ) and probability 
of false alarm (PF A). Then we tested our method with random frames chosen from 
each board. The results are encouraging and we have average 97.7% and 96.8% of 
PD for BPSK and QPSK modulation respectively. Also the PFA rates are very low, 
only 2.3% and 3.2% for each modulation. 
Finally, to analyze the impact of the channel on our signature scheme, we perform 
same set of experiments with indoor office setting of the Channel Emulator. Due to 
fading and multi-path effects, transmitted signals further deviate from the original 
signal. The presence of the channel also degrades the prediction rate of EVM based 
classifiers. However, I/Q offset and frequency offset classifiers are immune to channel 
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effect and due to weighted voting mechanism we still able to get high prediction rates. 
With the channel effect, we have an average of 96.6% and 95.9% PD for BPSK and 
QPSK modulations. Average PFA rate is only 3.4% for BPSK and 4.1% for QPSK. 
Our results are promising and clearly show the superior performance of our clas-
sification method. We have high PD values with low PF A rate for both static channel 
and indoor office environment. These values are calculated based on observation of 5 
frames and prediction rate will improve with the increase of sample set. 
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